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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2013, Act 258 of the 2012 Regular Session of
the Louisiana Legislature acquired the force of law. This
legislation, which came on the heels of over two years’ work by
the Louisiana Law Institute’s Rent of Lands and Annuities
Committee,1 contained a comprehensive revision of the articles in
Title X, Book III, of the Civil Code. Specifically, Act 258
completely repealed the prior Civil Code articles governing rents
and annuities2 and replaced them with revised articles 2778
through 2789 governing annuities. These new provisions embody a
number of fundamental changes in Louisiana property law, most
notably the creation of a new real right—the annuity charge.
This Article provides a first look at the newly revised articles in
Title X, Book III, of the Civil Code. Parts II and III closely examine
revised Chapters 1 and 2 pertaining to the annuity contract and the
annuity charge respectively. These Parts aim to provide practitioners
with a simplified outline of these new provisions, to resolve any
latent ambiguities possibly concealed within their terms, and to
highlight any potential problems that they may pose with respect to
other Civil Code articles. Part IV surveys the likely beneficiaries of
this new legislation in light of the limited alternatives that
preexisted its enactment. Finally, Part V briefly discusses some
economic benefits that these new articles may create.

1. Pursuant to its charter, a principal function of the Louisiana Law Institute
is “[t]o recommend the repeal of obsolete articles in the Civil Code and Code of
Civil Procedure and to suggest needed amendments, additions, and repeals.” LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:204(A)(8) (2007).
2. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2778–2792 (2012).
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II. REVISIONS TO CHAPTER 1 OF TITLE X, BOOK III: THE NEW AND
IMPROVED ANNUITY CONTRACT
Prior to the 2012 revision, the 14 articles contained in Chapter
1 of Title X, Book III, of the Louisiana Civil Code pertained to the
contract of rent of lands.3 Derived from the Roman institution of
emphyteusis,4 the rent of lands provisions were first incorporated
into the Civil Code in its 1825 revision.5 These contracts gave rise to
sui generis real rights and bore many similarities to the contracts of
sale and of lease.6 However, unlike the contracts of sale and of lease,
the Civil Code provisions on rent of lands have gone largely
unnoticed since their enactment in 1825. In fact, over the past two
centuries, the entire body of jurisprudence regarding rent of lands is
comprised of only a handful of reported decisions, none of which
were decided in the past 50 years.7 Recognizing the uselessness of
the rents of lands contract, the Louisiana Legislature decided to fully
repeal those articles in Act 258 and to eradicate the outdated
doctrine from the Civil Code altogether. In its place, the Legislature
implemented nine articles on annuity contracts, which change the
prior law in a few important respects.
A. Expanded Definition of Annuity Contract (Article 2778)
The definition of annuity contract in revised article 2778 is
much broader than its analogue under prior law. Most notably,
subsection A of article 2778 allows the transfer of “a thing” for the
3. Id. arts. 2779–2792.
4. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 225, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 434 (4th ed. 2001).
5. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2749–2763 (1825); see also YIANNOPOULOS,
supra note 4, § 255, at 434. In a typical rent of lands contract, one party would
convey immovable property to another perpetually, allowing the latter to hold it
as owner, in return for an annual rent of a certain sum of money or quantity of
fruits. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2779 (2012); see also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note
4, § 225, at 433.
6. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 225, at 434. The rights created by a
rent of lands contract were themselves classified as incorporeal immovables. See
LA. CIV. CODE art. 470 (2013).
7. See, e.g., Everett v. Clayton, 29 So. 2d 769 (1947); Vincent v. Bullock,
187 So. 35 (1939); La. & Ark. Ry. Co. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 59 So. 403,
407 (1911); J. Grossman’s Sons v. Sanders, 38 So. 692 (1905); City of New
Orleans v. Camp, 29 So. 340 (1901); Chenevert v. Lemoine, 27 So. 56 (1900);
Buford v. Collins, 6 So. 219 (1889); Friedler v. Chotard, 36 La. Ann. 276
(1884); Bourgeois’ Heirs v. Thibodaux, 23 La. Ann. 19 (1871); Sainet v.
Duchamp, 14 La. Ann. 539 (1859); Succession of Canonge, 1 La. Ann. 209
(1846); see also Gregory W. Rome, An Elegy for Emphyteusis, 1 CIV. L.
COMMENTARIES, no. 2, 2008, at 1, 4.
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right to periodic payments; whereas, the prior Code provision
limited such contracts to transfers of “a sum of money.”8 This
change significantly expands the scope of nominate annuity
contracts because it allows for the transfer of practically any
imaginable thing for a stream of payments.9 However, this new
group of annuity contract transactions is limited by subsection B of
article 2778, which states that contracts involving the transfer of
things other than money for “a certain or determinable price” are
not annuity contracts.10 Thus, to be classified as a nominate
annuity contract, a transfer of a thing other than money must be for
an indeterminate or uncertain number of payments.
By excluding transfers of things other than money for a
determinable price from annuity contracts, article 2778 prevents any
potential conflict with the Civil Code provisions on sales because
such a transaction is essentially a sale paid in amortized
installments. This is an appropriate justification for limiting the
breadth of the nominate annuity contract, but the same justification
exists for excluding transfers of money for a fixed stream of
payments in the same manner. After all, a transfer of money for a
predetermined number of periodic payments is practically
indistinguishable from an amortized loan,11 subject to the provisions
on loan of consumption.12 The failure to exclude such transfers from
the scope of annuity contracts will force courts to interpret them
with reference to each other13 and may result in unintended
consequences. For example, a court may conclude that, as the latest
8. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2778 (2013), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 2793
(2012).
9. The exception being common things, such as air and the high seas, which
are not subject to ownership of any kind. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 449 (2013).
Article 2778 also expands upon prior law by allowing the periodic payments made
under the annuity contract to be made to a third party as a stipulation pour autrui.
See id. art. 2778. In contrast, the prior law only contemplated two parties to an
annuity contract. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2793 (2012).
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2778 (2013).
11. The contract of loan is one of the nominate contracts expressly recognized
in the Louisiana Civil Code. Id. arts. 2891–2913. A loan for consumption
(mutuum) is one whereby “a person, the lender, delivers consumable things to
another, the borrower, who binds himself to return to the lender an equal amount
of things of the same kind and quality.” Id. art. 2904. These loans may be made
gratuitously or on interest. See SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 15.18, in 6
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 494 (1999).
12. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2904–2912 (2013).
13. Id. art. 13. See also Macon v. Costa, 437 So. 2d 806, 812 (La. 1983);
Rue Lafayette Mortg. Corp. v. Wenger, 366 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (La. Ct. App. 1st
1978); P. RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 7.7, in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 150 (2004).

2013]

BIRTH OF A REAL RIGHT

825

expression of the legislative will,14 article 2778 effects a partial
repeal of the loan articles, removing such transfers from their
purview. Considering the purpose of the Title X amendments, it
seems unlikely that the Legislature or the Law Institute actually
intended such a result.
B. Designated Recipients of Annuity Payments (Articles 2780,
2784, 2785, 2786)
The designated recipient in an annuity contract is the party
entitled to receive the periodic payments due under that contract.15
Article 2780 enables both natural persons and juridical persons to be
the designated recipient of annuity payments. The Civil Code
defines a natural person as “a human being” and a juridical person
as “an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a
corporation or a partnership.”16 The revised articles expressly
provide that an annuity contract may be established in favor of a
single designated recipient or multiple designated recipients. For
purposes of simplicity, each of these situations is covered separately
in the subsections below.
1. Annuity Contracts with a Single Designated Recipient
An annuity can only be established in favor of a juridical
person if that person “exist[s] at the time of the formation of the
annuity contract.”17 Likewise, to establish an annuity in favor of a
natural person, “that person must exist or be in utero at the time of
the formation of the annuity contract.”18 The requirement in article
2786 that a natural person either “exist or be in utero” at the time
that an annuity contract is formed slightly differs from the
14. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 8 (2013); see also Pumphrey v. City of New
Orleans, 925 So. 2d 1202, 1210 (La. 2006) (“Under general rules of statutory
construction, the latest expression of the legislative will is considered controlling
and prior enactments in conflict are considered as tacitly repealed in the absence of
an express repealing clause.” (citations omitted)); cf. LAMONICA & JONES, supra
note 13, § 6.3, at 110 (“It is well settled in Louisiana that repeals by implication
are not favored. Repeals by implication will be found only in cases of
irreconcilable conflict, and only when there exists no possible construction that
could give effect to both laws.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
15. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2778 (2013). Under article 2778, annuity is
defined as the right possessed by a designated recipient to the periodic payments
under the annuity contract. Id. In this sense, an annuity contract must be treated
as distinct from the annuity it establishes.
16. Id. art. 24.
17. Id. art. 2786.
18. Id.
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language used in the analogous usufruct article, which requires that
the usufructary “exist or be conceived” at the time the usufruct is
created.19 Although seemingly insignificant, this minor linguistic
difference can be very important. Whereas an embryo that is “in
utero” will always be “conceived,” the same is not necessarily true
when the terms are reversed, which raises the issue of how article
2786 will apply in the context of in vitro fertilization.
In vitro fertilization is a process by which a female egg is
fertilized with a male sperm in a laboratory setting and the newly
created embryo is then implanted into a woman’s uterus.20 Under
current medical practices, implantation typically occurs five to
seven days after the egg is fertilized.21 However, an optional
process called cryopreservation allows the fertilized embryo to be
frozen and stored at a low temperature for later implantation.22
Studies of cryopreservation have shown that the embryo can
“remain viable for at least several years, perhaps indefinitely.”23
Under a plain reading of article 2786, an annuity contract cannot
be created in favor of an in vitro fertilized embryo as a natural
person before implantation because it is not “in utero” before that
point.24 However, not all is lost for the poor embryo.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:123, “[a]n in vitro
fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person until such time
as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb.”25 Thus,
an annuity contract may still be created in favor of an embryo
before it has been implanted into the uterus, but such an annuity
contract will be governed by the provisions relating to annuity
contracts in favor of juridical persons. The annuity contract
provisions pertaining to juridical persons will continue to govern
the contract even after the embryo is implanted in the uterus and
eventually born. This result seems at odds with the purpose
underlying article 2780’s distinction between natural and juridical
persons. Therefore, although this issue may seldom arise in
practice, the new Title X articles would benefit if article 2786 were
amended to include the exist-or-be-conceived language of the
19. Compare id. art. 2786 (emphasis added), with id. art. 548 (emphasis
added).
20. See generally MARC A. FRITZ & LEON SPEROFF, CLINICAL GYNECOLOGIC
ENDOCRINOLOGY AND INFERTILITY (8th ed. 2011).
21. Id. at 261.
22. Id. at 1368.
23. Id. at 1369. See generally Yeong P. Lin et al., Successful Implantation
of Frozen Sibling Embryos Is Influenced by the Outcome of the Cycle from
Which They Were Derived, 63 FERTILITY & STERILITY 262 (1995).
24. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2786 (2013).
25. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (2008).
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usufruct articles instead of the exist-or-be-in-utero language that it
currently contains.
2. Annuity Contracts with More Than One Designated
Recipient
Article 2784 sanctions the double disposition of the right to
annuity payments in an annuity contract by providing that “[a]n
annuity may be established in favor of successive recipients.”26 A
similar provision is contained in the usufruct articles.27 This double
disposition does not constitute a prohibited substitution28 because
neither designated recipient is required to preserve the thing (right
to the payments). Of course, each successive recipient in such an
annuity contract must satisfy article 2786’s requirement that a
designated recipient either “exist” (natural and juridical persons) or
“be in utero” (natural persons) at the time the contract was made.29
Another way in which an annuity contract may be established
in favor of more than one designated recipient is contained in
article 2785, which provides:
An annuity contract may be established in favor of several
natural persons, whether in divided shares or in indivision.
When an annuity contract is established for the lifetimes of
several recipients of payments in indivision, the termination
of the interest of a recipient inures to the benefit of those
remaining unless the annuity contract expressly provides
otherwise.30
This article’s last sentence implies that when an annuity contract
is established for the lifetime of several recipients in divided shares,
the death of one of those recipients does not benefit the others.31
Thus, it is most advantageous to the designated recipients if the right
26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2784 (2013). This article will mostly apply to
situations in which one party transfers a thing other than money in exchange for
fixed periodic payments to himself until his death, after which the payments will
be made to his spouse until death. However, it would also apply to an annuity
contract in which one party transfers a sum of money to another in exchange for
fixed periodic payments to himself for the first five years and to his child for the
next five years.
27. Id. art. 546.
28. Id. art. 1520.
29. Id. art. 2786.
30. Id. art. 2758. Similar to article 2784, this provision also resembles a few
usufruct articles. See id. arts. 541, 547.
31. See also 1 AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 301, at 54 (La. St.
L. Inst. trans., 6th ed. 1965) (stating that when an obligation is divisible among
creditors, “[e]ach creditor can claim only his portion of the credit”).
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to the payments under an annuity contract are established in
indivision. When annuity payments are conferred jointly on two or
more persons, determining whether those payments were granted in
divided or undivided portions will be a matter of contractual
interpretation.32 An obligation to make annuity payments in favor of
several recipients without a clear expression to the contrary will
likely be interpreted as individual grants in divided shares because a
stream of money, by its nature, is susceptible of division into equal
shares.33 Therefore, the contract explicitly providing that the right to
such payments is granted in indivision is most beneficial to the
designated recipients.
C. Limits on the Contractual Duration of Payments Due Under
Annuity Contracts (Articles 2781, 2783)
One of the less noticeable differences between the annuity
contract created under the revision and the annuity contract that
existed under prior law is the limit on the contractual duration of
each. The old annuity articles provided that the periodic payments
due under an annuity contract “may be either perpetual or for life.”34
Conversely, revised article 2781 provides: “The payments under an
annuity contract may be for the lifetime of a designated natural
person, or, alternatively, for a period of time.”35 Although both
allow periodic payments to be made for the duration of a person’s
life, the old articles authorized a “perpetual” stream of payments
where the new articles permit payments “for a period of time.”36
This discrepancy raises a number of important questions about how
revised article 2781 will fit into the framework of Chapter 1.
1. Term and Life Annuities
The language of article 2781 permits the periodic payments
due under an annuity contract to be made “for a period of time.”
This class of annuities is like the common law concept of an
annuity certain, under which a series of payments are made at
32. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1815, 2758 (2013).
33. Id. art. 1815; SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 9.3, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 207 (2d ed. 2001) (“Following the language of the Louisiana Civil
Code, it must be concluded that some things that may be objects of performance
are divisible because of their nature, as in the case of a sum of money, which is no
doubt the clearest possible example.”).
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2794 (2012).
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2781 (2013).
36. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2781 (2013), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 2794
(2012).
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equal intervals over a fixed period of years, regardless of whether
the designated recipient dies before the period ends.37 Through
simple arithmetic, the “price” of such an annuity contract for
periodic payments over a fixed period of time can easily be
determined at the time of contracting. Therefore, in light of article
2778’s statement that “[a] contract transferring ownership of a
thing other than money for a certain or determinable price payable
over a term is not an annuity contract,”38 the only annuity contracts
that can be made “for a period of time” are those involving the
transfer of money for periodic payments. However, as mentioned
above, the propriety of designating such transactions as annuity
contracts is questionable, considering the conflict between the
annuity and loan provisions that will undoubtedly ensue.
Article 2781 also permits the periodic payments due under an
annuity contract to be made “for the lifetime of a designated
natural person.” Such an annuity contract contains conditional
rights and obligations with a resolutory condition (i.e., the death of
the “designated natural person”).39 Because a natural person’s
lifetime cannot be considered “certain or determinable” under
article 2778, this class of annuity contracts may be used for the
transfer of all types of things.40 Interestingly, article 2781 does not
appear to require that the “designated recipient” of the payments
from a life annuity be one in the same as the “designated natural
person” whose life determines the duration of those payments. For
example, if an elderly person with health issues is worried that the
annuity contract is a bad choice due to his unpredictable lifespan,
he can designate himself as the recipient of the annuity payments
and designate another person whose life will govern the duration of
those payments. That way, if he dies before the person designated
in the contract, his heirs would inherit the right to receive the
annuity payments pursuant to article 2783.41 Also, although article
2781 requires the duration of a life annuity be determined by a
natural person’s life, it does not exclude juridical persons from
37. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (9th ed. 2009).
38. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2778 (2013).
39. This is because an annuity contract is “immediately enforced but will
come to an end when the uncertain event occurs.” See id. art. 1767. This class of
annuity contracts is like the common law contingent annuity, which involves “an
uncertain number of payments, depending on the outcome of a future event.”
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (9th ed. 2009).
40. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2778 (2013).
41. The rights and obligations of the parties to an annuity contract are both
assignable and heritable unless the contract or a contrary provision of law
dictates otherwise. Id. art. 2783. Under Louisiana law, all obligations are
presumed to be heritable and transferrable. See id. art. 1984.
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receiving payments under a life annuity. This allows one to
establish a life annuity in favor of a trust or other juridical person
in exchange for a transfer of either money or something else.
2. Availability of Perpetual Annuities
Unlike the prior law, article 2781 does not explicitly sanction
perpetual annuities, which leaves uncertain the availability of such
instruments under the revision.42 One would have trouble arguing
that the statute’s reference to an obligation “for a period of time”
necessarily includes a “perpetual” obligation, which, by definition,
continues forever.43 Interestingly, despite the prior law’s explicit
statement that an annuity “may be either perpetual or for life,”44 it
was commonly interpreted as also permitting annuities “for a
designated term.”45 The permissive nature of the word may in article
2781 suggests that its terms are subject to the general principles of
contractual freedom.46 Thus, because the text of article 2781 can be
interpreted in multiple ways, its failure to mention a perpetual
stream of payments is likely not dispositive of whether a contract for
such payments will be considered an annuity contract under Chapter
1.47 In these situations, the statute must be interpreted so that it “best
conforms to the purpose of the law.”48
Because “[l]egislation is a solemn expression of legislative
will,”49 the proper interpretation of a law depends on ascertaining
legislative intent. As a general principle of statutory interpretation,
when an amendment to a statute deletes an express provision in the
text of a prior version of that statute, courts should assume that the
Legislature intended to make a substantial change in the law.50
42. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2781 (2013), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 2794
(2012).
43. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 923 (11th ed.
2003).
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2794 (2012).
45. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 150, at 347.
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:3 (2003) (“The word ‘shall’ is mandatory and
the word ‘may’ is permissive.”).
47. When the language of a statute is ambiguous, it should serve only as a
starting point for the interpretation of a statute. See In re Succession of Boyter,
756 So. 2d 1122, 1129 (La. 2000); see also LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 13,
§ 7.4, at 137–38.
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2013).
49. Id. art. 2.
50. See Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 397
(1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its
amendment to have real and substantial effect.” (citations omitted)); see also
Bouis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 F. Supp. 954, 958 (W.D. La. 1950).
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Another aid in discovering legislative intent is the judicial canon of
statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,51 which
presumes that when a statute provides for one thing in its text, it
presumptively excludes all matters not included.52 Although both of
these canons of statutory construction suggest that article 2781 does
not contemplate the existence of a perpetual annuity, the comments
to that article suggest otherwise.
The Official Revision Comment to article 2781 states: “In
accord with Article 2794 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
which declares that ‘[the] annuity may be either perpetual or for life’
the payments under an annuity contract may be for the life of a
designated recipient or for a period of time, certain or indefinite.”53
While revision comments do not form part of the law in Louisiana,
their purpose is to aid courts in the proper interpretation of the Code.
This is certainly the case for the comment to article 2781, which was
included in Act 258 by the Louisiana Law Institute in the initial bill
presented to the legislature.54 In such circumstances, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has placed significant weight on the comments’ text
in determining the legislators’ understanding and intent.55 Therefore,
although the courts will ultimately decide the true breadth of article
2794, the most logical conclusion is that the Legislature did
contemplate the possibility of perpetual annuity contracts when
enacting it.
D. Annuity Contracts That Fail to Provide a Designated Term
(Article 2782)
When the parties to an annuity contract fail to provide a term for
the annuity payments’ duration, the terms of article 2782 apply. This
article provides two different remedies to such situations, depending
on whether the designated recipient is a natural or juridical person:
“In the absence of a designated term, an annuity established in favor
51. Literally translated from Latin to mean: “[The] expression of one thing
implies the exclusion of another.” LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 13, § 7.6, at
147.
52. The Louisiana Supreme Court has a long history of recognizing the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a useful aid in determining
legislative intent. See Int’l Paper Co., Inc. v. Hilton, 966 So. 2d 545, 558–59 (La.
2007); Filson v. Windsor Court Hotel, 907 So. 2d 723, 728 (La. 2005); State ex
rel. Fitzpatrick v. Grace, 175 So. 656, 662 (1936); City of Shreveport v. Price, 77
So. 883, 885 (1918).
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2781 cmt. a (2013) (alteration in original).
54. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 258 (H.B. 466) (May 25, 2012) (West).
55. See, e.g., Green v. Auto Club Grp. Ins. Co., 24 So. 3d 182, 185 (La.
2009); Wartelle v. Women’s & Children’s Hosp., Inc., 704 So. 2d 778, 783 (La.
1997); Mock v. Mock, 411 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (La. 1982).
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of a natural person terminates upon the death of that person, but one
in favor of a juridical person is without effect.”56 At least two
aspects of this article’s terms warrant discussion. First, the language
without effect is unclear in reference to annuity contracts in favor of
juridical persons when there is no designated term. Second, there is
no apparent explanation for the article’s different treatment of
annuity contracts without a designated term in favor of natural
persons and those in favor of juridical persons.
1. Defining Without Effect
It is an often repeated maxim of the Louisiana Supreme Court
that “the starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the
language of the statute itself.”57 The Civil Code dictates that
“[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous” its terms should be given
full effect, and “no further interpretation may be made in search of
the intent of the legislature.”58 However, the meaning behind article
2782’s term without effect is not “clear and unambiguous” because it
may be construed as referring to either a relative nullity,59 an
absolute nullity,60 or an inexistent act,61 all of which may be deemed
to have no effect. Practically, whether an act is classified as
inexistent or absolutely null will have little bearing on how a court
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2782 (2013).
57. See, e.g., Miller v. LAMMICO, 973 So. 2d 693, 705 (La. 2008)
(citations omitted); In re Succession of Boyter, 756 So. 2d 1122, 1129 (La.
2000) (citations omitted); Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885, 888 (La. 1993)
(citations omitted).
58. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2013). See also LAMONICA & JONES, supra note
13, § 7.4, at 137–38.
59. The Louisiana Civil Code defines relative nullity as a contract that
“violates a rule intended for the protection of private parties, as when a party
lacked capacity or did not give free consent at the time the contract was made.”
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2031 (2013).
60. The Louisiana Civil Code defines absolute nullity as a contract that
“violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or
immoral.” Id. art. 2030.
61. Under French doctrine, an inexistent act is one that “lacks an element
essential to its formation and when this element is such that the act cannot be
conceived of with this feature absent from it.” 1 PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CIVIL, No. 345, at 231 (La. St. L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959). This
definition is very similar to the language of Louisiana Civil Code article 2029,
which states the general proposition that “[a] contract is null when the
requirements for its formation have not been met.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2029
(2013). Indeed, in at least one case, the Louisiana Supreme Court has confirmed
inexistent acts as one of three distinct categories of nullity in Louisiana. See Cox
v. Lea’s Heirs, 35 So. 275, 280 (1903) (on rehearing). Therefore, although the
Louisiana Civil Code does not expressly mention “inexistent acts,” this doctrine
remains an independent legal precept in Louisiana.
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will treat it.62 Be that as it may, the proper categorization of the term
without effect in article 2782 remains important because the
consequences of classifying an act as either inexistent or absolutely
null differ substantially from the consequences of an act’s
classification as a relative nullity.63
Because the term without effect in article 2782 is “susceptible of
different meanings,” it must be given the meaning that “best
conforms to [its] purpose.”64 To ascertain the purpose of a law, one
should only examine “the legislation itself in its entirety or related
legislation.”65 A great deal of insight into the legislative intent
underlying article 2782’s term without effect may be gleaned from
the Official Revision Comment, which states: “In the absence of a
designated term, an annuity established in favor of a juridical person
is without effect because a substantive legal requirement for the
formation of the contract has not been met.”66 In light of this
clarification, an act that is “without effect” seems to fit neatly within
the description of an inexistent act, namely an act that “lacks an
element essential to its formation and . . . cannot be conceived of
with this feature absent from it.”67 Therefore, an annuity contract in
favor of a juridical person with no designated term is an inexistent
act.
62. The distinction between an absolute nullity and an inexistent act is
largely of academic significance: An absolute nullity is an act “annulled by
operation of law,” whereas, an inexistent act is one “which the law need not
annul because it has not come into existence.” PLANIOL, supra note 61, No. 333,
at 222. However, these types of nullity should not be viewed as one and the
same because the Civil Code does give limited effect to absolute nullities in rare
circumstances. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2033 (2013) (“[A] performance rendered
under a contract that is absolutely null because its object or its cause is illicit or
immoral may not be recovered by a party who knew or should have known of
the defect that makes the contract null.”).
63. In contrast with absolute nullities and inexistent acts, which are
imprescriptible and may be raised by anyone, relative nullities have a five-year
prescriptive period and may be invoked only by “those persons for whose
interest the ground for nullity was established, and may not be declared by the
court on its own initiative.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2031 (2013). See also id. arts.
2029–2030, 2032.
64. See id. art. 10; see also In re Succession of Boyter, 756 So. 2d 1122,
1129 (La. 2000).
65. LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 13, § 7.8, at 155.
66. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2782 cmt. (2013) (emphasis added). Courts have
found the Official Comments to a Civil Code article helpful in revealing the
legislative intent and purpose in enacting the statute. See Arabie v. CITGO
Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307, 312 (La. 2012); Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy
Co., 24 So. 3d 813, 816 n.5 (La. 2009); Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex
Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 797 (La. 2005).
67. PLANIOL, supra note 61, No. 345, at 231.
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2. Seeking a Justification for the Juridical Discrimination
The conclusion reached in the previous discussion begs the
question why article 2782 does not give effect to such contracts in
the first place. When an annuity in favor of a natural person is
lacking a designated term, article 2782 supplies the missing term—
“the death of that [natural] person.”68 Therefore, a designated term
is clearly a nonessential element to the formation of an annuity
contract in favor of a natural person, but it is an essential element
to the formation of an annuity contract in favor of a juridical
person. To understand the drafters’ justification for discriminating
against juridical persons in article 2782, one must first consider
each different way that the article could have been written so to
supply a term to annuity contracts in favor of juridical persons.
There are two possible ways that this could have been done, both
of which ultimately prove to be unacceptable.
The drafters could have supplied a missing term to annuity
contracts in favor of juridical persons with a provision stating that
the right to the periodic payments terminates upon the dissolution
of the juridical person. Certainly, this would have made article
2782’s treatment of annuity contracts in favor of juridical persons
appear comparable to its treatment of those in favor of natural
persons. However, the drafters properly denied this approach
because when the parties to an annuity contract forget to designate
a term, it should not be inferred that they bargained for the rights
and obligations under the contract to continue perpetually.
Therefore, due to a juridical person’s potentially infinite lifespan,
the imposition of such a term in the absence of one would
undermine the parties’ contractual intent and provide one side with
an undeserved windfall.
The drafters also could have supplied a missing term to annuity
contracts in favor of juridical persons with a provision assigning
such contracts a predetermined fixed term. This approach provides
a tidy solution to the perpetual-existence problem and has been
previously adopted in the usufruct articles. Like many of the other
articles pertaining to annuity contracts, article 2782 has an
analogue in the Civil Code provisions on usufruct.69 Article 608
provides that when a usufruct is established in favor of a juridical
person, the usufruct terminates when the entity ceases to exist or
upon the lapse of 30 years from the date of the commencement of
the usufruct.70 By supplying the missing term to these contracts,
68. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2782 (2013).
69. Id. arts. 607–608.
70. Id. art. 608.

2013]

BIRTH OF A REAL RIGHT

835

article 608 serves the dual purpose of preserving the testator’s
intent on the one hand and solving the perpetual-existence problem
on the other.71 However, the annuity contract is incompatible with
a wholehearted adoption of the usufruct approach. If article 2782
were to provide that the stream of annuity payments terminates
when the juridical person ceases to exist, or upon the lapse of 30
years, it would violate the terms of article 2778 in all cases
involving transfers of things other than money.72 Therefore, the
drafters correctly refused to provide a term like the one in the
usufruct articles to annuity contracts. This leaves the current
approach taken in article 2782 with respect to annuity contracts in
favor of juridical persons without a designated term as the only
acceptable option.
E. Default Rules When No Title X Rule Applies (Article 2779)
Article 2779 articulates the specific titles of the Civil Code that
will apply to annuity contracts when no specific provisions are
contained in Title X. For this purpose, it splits annuity contracts
into three different categories,73 each governed by different titles of
Book III when Title X is silent on an issue: (1) All onerous annuity
contracts are governed by both Title III74 (Obligations in General)
and Title IV75 (Conventional Obligations or Contracts); (2)
onerous annuity contracts for the transfer of a thing other than
money are also governed by Title VII76 (Sales); and (3) gratuitous
annuity contracts are governed by Title II77 (Donations). Although
the prior law was silent on the applicability of other titles, the
default provisions in article 2779 are uncontroversial. In fact,
similar provisions govern many of the different nominate onerous
contracts in Book III, including those on sale,78 lease,79
partnership,80 loans,81 and deposit.82 Likewise, many of Book III’s
71. See Female Orphan Soc’y v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 44 So. 15
(1907); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2679 (2012) (limiting the maximum duration
of lease contracts to 99 years).
72. Article 2778 provides that contracts transferring things “other than
money for a certain or determinable price” are not annuity contracts. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2778 (2013).
73. Id. art. 2779.
74. Id. arts. 1756–1905.
75. Id. arts. 1906–2057.
76. Id. arts. 2438–2659.
77. Id. arts. 1467–1751.
78. See id. art. 2438.
79. See id. art. 2669.
80. See id. art. 2802.
81. See id. art. 2892.
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articles applicable to nominate contracts involving the transfer of a
thing other than money express that the rules of sale in Title VII
apply absent an applicable rule in the relevant Title.83 Lastly,
Article 2779’s command that the rules applicable to donations
apply to gratuitous annuity contracts84 is similarly unremarkable.
These default provisions will be useful in clarifying a few issues
that the revised articles do not expressly address.
One matter left unanswered in Chapter 1’s annuity contract
articles is whether these contracts are subject to rescission for lesion
beyond moiety.85 Under article 2779, annuity contracts involving the
transfer of money are subject to the provisions in Titles III and IV
when no special provision exists in the annuity contract articles.
Article 1965 in Title IV declares: “A contract may be annulled on
grounds of lesion only in those cases provided by law.”86 Because
no article in Titles III, IV, or X can be read to subject annuity
contracts to lesion, this doctrine is clearly inapplicable to annuity
contracts for the transfer of money.
Article 2779 subjects annuity contracts for the transfer of a
thing other than money to the rules in Titles III, IV, and VII when
no special provision in the annuity articles applies. Article 2589 in
Title VII provides that “[t]he sale of an immovable may be
rescinded for lesion when the price is less than one half of the fair
market value of the immovable.”87 Thus, the application of the
relevant provisions in Title IV and Title VII leads to the conclusion
that lesion does apply to annuity contracts for transfers of
immovables. However, even if lesion is theoretically applicable to

82. See id. art. 2927.
83. One example is the contract of exchange, in which “each party transfers
to the other the ownership of a thing other than money.” Id. art. 2660. See also
id. art. 2664. Another is the contract of giving in payment, in which “an obligor
gives a thing to the obligee, who accepts it in payment of a debt.” Id. art. 2655.
See also id. art. 2659. The repealed rent of lands articles, concerning transfers of
land for an indefinite stream of payments, similarly dictated that the rules in
Title VII applied when no relevant Title X article existed. LA. CIV. CODE art.
2783 (2012).
84. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1910 (2013) (“A contract is gratuitous when one
party obligates himself towards another for the benefit of the latter, without
obtaining any advantage in return.”).
85. Id. art. 2589 (“The sale of an immovable may be rescinded for lesion
when the price is less than one half of the fair market value of the immovable.
Lesion can be claimed only by the seller and only in sales of corporeal
immovables. It cannot be alleged in a sale made by order of the court.”).
86. Id. art. 1965.
87. Id. art. 2589.
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annuity contracts for transfers of immovables, courts may refuse to
apply this doctrine to such a contract for two reasons.
One reason that a court may not apply lesion to these contracts is
because transactions “that are speculative and conjectural as to
identity and value are not subject to rescission on the grounds of
lesion beyond moiety.”88 In short, whether courts apply lesion to
contracts depends on the level of certainty with which the contract
can be valued at the time of the transfer. Lesion requires the seller to
show that the amount that he received was “less than one half of the
fair market value of the immovable.”89 In the annuity contract
context, this determination will compare the value of the periodic
payments due under the contract and the value of the thing given in
exchange. It is unlikely that a court will find the fair market value of
an annuity contract containing a reservation of usufruct or right of
habitation to meet this level of certainty.90 However, annuity
contracts without such a reservation of usufruct or right of habitation
do not pose the same problem.91
The second reason that a court may refuse to apply lesion to an
annuity contract for the transfer of an immovable is that,
realistically, these transactions will be primarily utilized in
intrafamily transactions. In transactions between related parties, a
court can easily find the donative intent required to classify the
entire transaction as a donation instead of a sale.92 Thus, even if it
can be shown to a legal certainty that a contract is “less than one half
of the fair market value of the immovable,” a court will likely
uphold the transfer as an inter vivos onerous or remunerative
88. White v. Oakley, 191 So. 2d 904, 906 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1966) (citations
omitted). See also Dosher v. La. Church of God, 71 So. 2d 868, 870 (1954);
Cook v. Mixon, 700 So. 2d 1264, 1267–70 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1997); Succession
of Witting, 46 So. 606 (1908) (“[T]he burden is on the vendor to prove lesion by
evidence peculiarly strong and convincing, and of such a nature as to exclude
speculation and conjecture.”).
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2013).
90. See Cheramie v. St. Pierre, 382 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (La. Ct. App. 2d
1980) (holding that a conveyance of property subject to a life usufruct is
speculative and conjectural and therefore not subject to rescission for lesion).
91. To show lesion in such a contract, one would first ascertain the market
value of the immovable at the time of the transaction. Then, this dollar amount
may be used to determine the periodic amount of money that an insurance
company would pay for a life annuity for that amount. Finally, this periodic
amount that the designated recipient would have received under a commercial
insurance annuity would then be compared to the amount actually received
under the contract in question to determine if it is less than one-half of the
market value.
92. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 522 So. 2d 1356 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1988);
Fenger v. Cagnolatti, 292 So. 2d 901 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1974).
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donation.93 Civil Code articles 1526 and 1527 suggest that a transfer
of a thing for less than two-thirds its value will be classified as a
donation inter vivos.94 Ultimately, it is unlikely that the sales
concept of lesion will affect annuity contracts at all.
III. REVISIONS TO CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE X, BOOK III: CREATION OF
THE ANNUITY CHARGE
When an annuity contract is used to transfer an immovable for
a stream of payments, there are many ways that the transferor may
find himself in a precarious position. If the transferee loses his job,
faces unexpected bills, or becomes bankrupt, the transferor may
not receive the full balance of the annuity payments on time or at
all. In these situations, if the transferee had previously disposed of
the immovable or encumbered it with a real right, the transferor
will be left with little recourse because an annuity contract is
simply a personal obligation. The Louisiana Legislature addressed
these concerns in revised article 2787, which authorizes the parties
to an annuity contract transferring an immovable to establish “a
charge on the immovable for the periodic payments due under the
contract.”95 It further provides that if such an annuity charge is
established, the designated recipient of the payments “acquires a
real right for periodic payments.”96 This marks the first appearance
of the annuity charge in Louisiana’s Civil Code. It also stands as
the first addition of a real right to the Code since the enactment of
the building restrictions articles in the 1970s.97 For these reasons,
the revision to Chapter 2 of Title X, Book III, has the potential to
bring about significant changes in the existing landscape of
Louisiana property law. The following sections are dedicated to
examining its contents.
A. General Characteristics of the Annuity Charge as a Real Right
As with the enactment of any new property right in Louisiana, a
cloud of uncertainty looms over many of the basic characteristics of
93. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1526 (2013); see also Fenger v. Cagnolatti, 292
So. 2d 901, 904 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1974) (finding there to be sufficient evidence to
show that the transfer of the real property from a mother to her son was really an
onerous and remunerative donation given to him for his acts of uprooting his
family, moving to his mother’s home, and caring for his mother for the remainder
of her life).
94. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1526–1527 (2013).
95. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2787 (2013).
96. Id.
97. Act No. 170, 1977 La. Acts 629–45.
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the right created by the annuity charge. Determining how the
annuity charge fits into the Civil Code’s existing taxonomy of such
rights should help clarify some of these issues. At the broadest level
of classification, there are two categories of real rights in Louisiana–
–perfect ownership and iura in re aliena––and the annuity charge in
article 2787 clearly falls into the latter.98 Louisiana doctrine further
classifies real rights as either principal99 or accessory.100 In this
regard, the annuity charge should be considered an accessory rather
than a principal real right because its sole purpose is to secure the
periodic payments due under an annuity contract.101
The annuity charge’s status as a real right provides several
practical benefits to the party in whose favor it was created. First, if
the transferee under an annuity contract becomes insolvent, the
holder of an annuity charge is entitled to be paid what he is owed
before other creditors having merely personal rights.102 With respect
to other holders of real rights, the “first in time” rule will govern.103
Second, the holder of the annuity charge need not worry about the
transferee selling the property and skipping town because the
annuity charge is a right over the immovable itself and continues to
exist in whoever’s possession it may be found.104 However, like any
other real right, for the annuity charge to be effective as to third
parties, “the annuity contract establishing it [must be] recorded in
the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is
located.”105
Article 2787 permits the use of an annuity charge to secure the
payments due under an “annuity contract transferring an
immovable.”106 Implicit within this provision is the possibility that
the annuity charge may be used to secure annuity contracts for the
transfer of buildings, construction, standing timber, or other
unharvested crops when the transferor does not own the ground on
which such things stand.107 The terms of this article also seem to
98. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 237, at 482.
99. Id. § 223, at 427 (“The principal real rights pertain to the substance of
the thing which is placed at the service of the holder of the right.”).
100. Id. (“The accessory real rights, that is, accessory to obligations of which
they guarantee payment, pertain to the pecuniary value of a thing.”).
101. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2787 (2013).
102. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 215, at 413; LITVINOFF, supra note 33,
§ 1.5, at 9.
103. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 215, at 413.
104. Id. at 412–13; LITVINOFF, supra note 33, § 1.5, at 9.
105. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2788 (2013). See also id. art. 3338(1). Such
recordation will not create a presumption “that the instrument is valid” or a
presumption “as to the capacity or status of the parties.” Id. art. 3341.
106. Id. art. 2787.
107. See id. art. 491.
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contemplate the use of an annuity charge to secure an annuity
contract for the transfer of an incorporeal immovable, such as the
rights under a lease, a predial servitude, or mineral rights.108
Furthermore, the reference to annuity contract, without more, may
be read to include nominate annuity contracts created under article
2778 as well as innominate annuity contracts. Although there
exists no clear policy reason to restrict the annuity charge’s
applicability to nominate annuity contracts, the most plausible
reading of article 2787 is one which does just that, simply because
the annuity charge and annuity contract both appear within Title X.
B. Limits on the Duration of the Annuity Charge
Under Article 2790, the annuity charge is expressly limited in
duration—it “may not exceed thirty years, except that it may
continue for the lifetime of a recipient who is a natural person.”109
This limit on an annuity charge’s duration may pose a problem for
annuity contracts in which the designated recipient is not the same
person to whose lifetime the stream of payments is tied. In theory,
an annuity charge could be used to secure an annuity contract under
which the perpetual payments are to be paid to one person for the
duration of another person’s life. If the person whose life determines
the duration of the annuity payments lives past 30 years but the
designated recipient does not, a plain reading of article 2790
suggests that any annuity charge on the immovable would terminate
after 30 years. However, the personal rights and obligations
surrounding the periodic payments in the underlying annuity
contract would not terminate despite termination of the annuity
charge securing those payments.
C. Enforcement of the Annuity Charge
The provision in revised article 2791 establishes the legal
process by which a designated recipient may enforce the annuity
charge should the transferee fail to periodically pay under the
annuity contract. Under its terms, “the [designated] recipient may
obtain judgment for the amounts due and may enforce the judgment
108. See id. art. 470; see also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 147, at 340
(“[R]ights classified as incorporeal immovables ought to be governed by the
laws applicable to corporeal immovables, unless such laws are insusceptible of
application to rights.”).
109. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2790 (2013). Of course, an annuity charge may also
terminate before this time through the principles of confusion if the payment
designee under an annuity contract containing the charge becomes the owner of
the property subject to the charge. See id. art. 1903.
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by execution upon the immovable subject to the annuity charge in
accordance with law.”110 Because its language seems to require a
“judgment for the amounts due” before the immovable is seized and
sold, article 2791 does not appear to contemplate annuity charge
enforcement through executory proceedings.111 The effect of a
judgment in a proceeding for the enforcement of an annuity charge
“does not extinguish the annuity charge for amounts thereafter
becoming due under the contract.”112 This makes the annuity charge
far superior to a mortgage for securing annuity contracts because the
mortgagee’s real right on the property would terminate after the sale,
whereas the annuity charge remains on the property in the hands of
the purchaser to secure all future payments coming due under the
annuity contract.113
IV. THE NEED FOR THE REVISION: THE REVERSE MORTGAGE
PROBLEM
One of the stated purposes of the revision to Title X was “to
provide for Louisiana owners a modern, effective, and efficient
tool for acquisition of financial resources as an alternative to the
so-called reverse mortgage.”114 For many of America’s senior
citizens, maintaining a home can be an enormous financial burden.
Although the ability to sell one’s house to alleviate this problem is
always an option, most seniors want to live in their homes for the
rest of their lives.115 This dilemma led to the development of the
reverse mortgage, a financial instrument that both provides seniors
with a considerable amount of money and also allows them to
remain in their houses. Generally speaking, a mortgage is “[a]
conveyance of title to property that is given as security for the
payment of a debt.”116 A homeowner with a conventional mortgage
makes periodic amortized payments to the lender according to the
loan’s requirements, which eventually extinguish the debt and

110. Id. art. 2791.
111. Executory proceedings are commonly “used to effect the seizure and sale
of property, without previous citation and judgment” to enforce a conventional
real mortgage. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2631 (2013).
112. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2791 (2013).
113. See id.
114. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2787 cmt. a (2013).
115. AARP, FIXING TO STAY: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF HOUSING AND HOME
MODIFICATION ISSUES 24–25 (2000), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter
/il/home_mod.pdf.
116. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1101 (9th ed. 2009). These security devices
are commonly used with residential housing loans.

842

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

release the property from the mortgage.117 In contrast, the
homeowner with a reverse mortgage does not have to make any
payments to the lender, and the interest that accrues on the loan is
simply added to the outstanding debt.118 In essence, “[a] reverse
mortgage is a loan against the equity a senior has built up in his or
her home.”119
This concept was first introduced in the 1960s, but it became
popular only after Congress passed the Housing Community and
Development Act (HCDA) of 1987. The HCDA of 1987 created
the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program and
provided federal insurance to all reverse mortgage loans that met
certain criteria.120 To be eligible for such a HECM loan, a
homeowner must (1) be 62 years old or older, (2) have substantial
equity in his home, and (3) receive approved counseling about the
program.121 Under the HECM program, borrowers are not required
to repay the loan amount as long as they live in the home subject to
the loan, adequately maintain the property, and pay property taxes
and homeowner’s insurance premiums on time.122 The HCDA of
1987 viewed the reverse mortgage as a means of allowing millions
of cash-strapped Americans who were relatively rich in home
equity to draw on some (but not all) of that stored value.123 In
recent years, the use of the reverse mortgage as a financial device
has exploded.124 Between 2001 and 2009, the annual volume of
117. Each payment of a conventional mortgage includes both interest and
principal. The payments increase the equity in the home by the amount of the
principal included in the payment.
118. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (9th ed. 2009).
119. NORMA PAZ GARCIA, PRESCOTT COLE & SHAWNA REEVES, EXAMINING
FAULTY FOUNDATIONS IN TODAY’S REVERSE MORTGAGES 5 (2010), available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/reverse-mortgage-report-2010.pdf. The most
significant financial asset of the vast majority of America’s seniors is the family
home. See AM. BAR ASS’N, REVERSE MORTGAGES: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO
HOUSING AND INCOME ALTERNATIVES 9 (David Bridewell & Charles Nauts, eds.
1997). In a 2000 survey, 86% of respondents 55 or older indicated that they own
their homes. AARP, supra note 115, at 17.
120. Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100242, § 417(a), 101 Stat. 1815 (1988) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z20).
121. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV. (HUD), HOME EQUITY
CONVERSION MORTGAGES HANDBOOK 2, 4–5 (1994), available at http://www
.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/4235.1/42351c1HSGH.pdf.
122. GARCIA, COLE & REEVES, supra note 119, at 37. Reverse mortgage
loans are “non-recourse” home loans, meaning that the debt is secured only by
the home, and the lender cannot pursue the borrower(s) upon a default, even if
the amount of the debt exceeds the house’s market value. HUD, supra note 121,
at 1, 6.
123. See id. at 1.
124. GARCIA, COLE & REEVES, supra note 119, at 3.
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these loans increased a stunning 1,373%, a number that will
certainly increase in the near future as the first wave of the baby
boomers quickly approaches retirement.125 Recently, however, it
has become increasingly clear that the HECM loan should be
considered a last resort for those in need of cash.126
For several reasons, reverse mortgage loans are an inefficient
and risky way of obtaining cash. The expensive fees associated
with obtaining the loan are often added to the principal balance
from the outset, which allows the lender to collect additional
interest on them.127 Additionally, almost all reverse mortgage loans
involve compounding interest rates.128 Most troubling is that many
seniors entering reverse mortgages are unaware of the substantial
risk that the loan may come due before dying or, even worse, that
it will become due immediately after dying and leave their spouses
with nothing.129 In August 2010, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development published the results of an internal audit
brought about by the increasing default rate of HECM loans, which
found that upwards of 20,000 of the outstanding loans were
currently in default.130 In short, reverse mortgages have left
thousands of America’s seniors with very uncertain retirements.131
Before last summer, the reverse mortgage was the only practical
way that Louisiana’s property owners could quickly obtain cash
from the stored equity in their homes and still have the ability to
125. Id. at 1–2.
126. Id. at 6–8.
127. Id. at 6–7.
128. Reverse mortgages are exempt from Louisiana’s prohibition on
compounding interest and laws on usury. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3504(A)
(2009).
129. This typically occurs when one spouse is old enough (over 65) to
qualify for the reverse mortgage and the other is not. Reverse mortgage
counselors have been reported even to have promoted this situation by telling
couples that they are eligible for more money if only one spouse signs the loan.
In these situations, when the spouse who signed onto the mortgage dies, the
other spouse will be forced to pay off the loan’s balance or face foreclosure
because, unlike the signatory spouse whose ability to live in the house is
protected by the loan, the surviving spouse is not similarly protected.
130. GERALD R. KIRKLAND, AUDIT REPORT: HUD WAS NOT TRACKING
ALMOST 13,000 HECM LOANS WITH MAXIMUM CLAIM AMOUNTS OF
POTENTIALLY MORE THAN $2.5 BILLION 11 (2010), available at http://www.hud
.gov/offices/oig/reports/files/ig1060003.pdf. The report found that this increase in
default rates was due to more borrowers failing to pay the taxes or homeowners
insurance premiums on their homes as required under the terms of the loan. Id. at
9–10.
131. Ironically, these government-backed financial instruments, intended to
free up extra money for struggling seniors, have left many widows and
widowers on the brink of foreclosure.
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reside there. By revising the articles in Title X of the Civil Code, the
Louisiana Legislature provided property owners with a modern,
effective, and efficient alternative to the reverse mortgage for inter
vivos acquisition of financial resources.132 When used in conjunction
with a reserved right of habitation,133 an annuity contract
transferring an immovable for a stream of payments will have
effects analogous to those of a reverse mortgage. However, one
must keep in mind that, although the revision may have been
prompted by the problems associated with this financial instrument,
the revised articles in Title X, Book III, were not designed to
provide a functional equivalent to the reverse mortgage. They were
simply intended to provide an alternative method for Louisiana’s
seniors to obtain a secured stream of payments from their existing
home equity.
V. ANCILLARY FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF THE ANNUITY CHARGE
CONTRACT
The previous Part discussed how an annuity contract secured by
an annuity charge provides an alternative to the reverse mortgage
that is simple, feasible, and secure for the recipient, without the risk
of eviction or foreclosure inherent in the reverse mortgage. In
addition to these virtues, annuity charge contracts may provide at
least two other advantages over the reverse mortgage. First, the
current wording of federal and state bankruptcy statutes suggests
that the periodic payments due under an annuity contract will be
immunized from the beneficiary’s creditors in bankruptcy. Second,
the current enrollment and accounting requirements of the Louisiana
Medicaid program favor the annuity charge contract in a number of
ways.
A. Bankruptcy Protection
Annuity contracts under these new Civil Code articles may be
able to provide asset-shielding benefits to the designated recipient of
the payments under that contract should he fall into bankruptcy. The
United States Bankruptcy Code provides that when a debtor files a
bankruptcy petition, commencing bankruptcy proceedings, an estate
132. This was one of the stated purposes of the legislation. See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2787 cmt. a (2013).
133. See id. art. 630 (“Habitation is the nontransferable real right of a natural
person to dwell in the house of another.”); see also A.N. YIANNOPOULOS,
PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 8:11, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 546–48
(5th ed. 2011).
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is created, which includes all of the property in which the debtor had
a legal or equitable interest at the time that the petition is filed.134
The debtor may then proceed to exempt certain property from that
bankruptcy estate.135 Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is
allowed to choose136 between two sources of such allowable
exemptions: (1) the list of ten exemptions contained in 11 U.S.C. §
522(d),137 or (2) the exemptions contained in the applicable law of
the State where the debtor’s domicile was located 730 days before
the petition is filed.138 Thus, the Federal Bankruptcy Code allows a
debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding to rely on Louisiana law to
exempt property from the bankruptcy estate.
Under the relevant section of the Louisiana Revised Statutes,
[t]he lawful beneficiary, assignee, or payee . . . of an
annuity contract shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails
of the contract against the creditors and representatives of
the annuitant . . . and the proceeds and avails shall also be
exempt from all liability for any debt of the beneficiary,
payee, or assignee or estate, existing at the time the
proceeds or avails are made available for his own use.139
This section defines an annuity contract as any contract that
“[s]tates on its face or anywhere within the terms of the contract
that it is an ‘annuity’ including but not limited to an immediate,
deferred, fixed, equity indexed, or variable annuity, irrespective of
current pay status or any other definition of ‘annuity’ in Louisiana
law.”140 A plain reading of this section leads to the conclusion that
the periodic payments to which an annuity contract designee is
entitled under Civil Code article 2778 are immune from that
designee’s bankruptcy creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).141

134. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
135. Id. § 522.
136. Under the relevant Bankruptcy Code provision, “an individual debtor
may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph
(2) or, in the alternative, paragraph (3) of this subsection.” Id. § 522(b)(1)
(emphasis added).
137. Id. § 522(b)(2).
138. Id. § 522(b)(3). The debtor can also rely on exemptions contained in
federal law other than those in § 522(b)(2). Id.
139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:912(B)(1) (Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).
140. Id. § 22:912(B)(2).
141. See In re Orso, 283 F.3d 686, 697 (5th Cir. 2002).
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B. Medicaid Benefits
The annuity charge contract is much more appropriate than a
reverse mortgage for those who will eventually need long-term
nursing home care.142 The astronomical costs of nursing home care
can quickly wipe out an individual’s entire life savings unless he
qualifies for means-tested benefit programs such as Medicaid.
Because Medicaid is essentially a health insurance program for the
poor, one’s income and total assets must fall below a limit
determined state by state to be eligible.143 In Louisiana, single
applicants can have at most $2,000 in total assets and can make at
most $2,022 per month.144 All other assets above these limits are
considered “countable assets” and will have to be “spent down”
before the senior can be eligible for Medicaid benefits. An
applicant’s home is not considered an asset for eligibility. However,
reverse mortgage payouts will impact a borrower’s Medicaid
eligibility.145 A senior who has entered a reverse mortgage for a
lump-sum payment will have to spend down this money before
Medicaid will begin making payments.146 Furthermore, the terms of
many reverse mortgages require the senior to actually live in the
house, so those requiring an extended stay in a nursing home risk
having the balance of the loan come due.147 In contrast, the senior
who opts for an annuity contract instead of a reverse mortgage will
have neither of these headaches as long as the monthly or annual
payments do not exceed Medicaid’s limit.
Although a person’s primary residence is not a quantifiable asset
for Louisiana long-term care Medicaid eligibility, the beneficiary’s
home is not equally protected after death. All states implementing a
Medicaid program are required to establish an estate recovery
program in accordance with Subchapter XIX of the Social Security
142. This discussion will also apply to those who intend to utilize Medicaid
benefits because they have chronic conditions uncovered by an insurance plan.
143. Most states use a percentage of the federal poverty guidelines as the
measuring stick to determine eligibility.
144. LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HOSPS., OFFICE OF AGING & ADULT SERVS.,
NURSING FACILITY SERVICES FACT SHEET 2 (2011), available at http://new
.dhh.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/OAAS/publications/Nursing_Facilities_Fact_Sheet
_CAAA.pdf. Married applicants can have at most $3,000 in total assets and can
make at most $4,044 per month. Id.
145. GARCIA, COLE & REEVES, supra note 119, at 7.
146. Id.
147. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumer Information: Reverse Mortgages,
FTC.GOV (Mar. 2011), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0192-reversemortgages (“[A] borrower can live in a nursing home or other medical facility
for up to 12 consecutive months before the loan must be repaid.”).
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Act148 “for the purpose of recovering medical assistance payments
made on behalf of individual recipients from the succession estates
of those individuals.”149 Under Louisiana’s program, the State will
maintain a lien on the beneficiary’s interest in the residence and,
upon his or her death, enforce the lien up to the amount of care the
beneficiary received.150 Accordingly, even if a reverse-mortgage
debtor manages to avoid foreclosure while still alive, once he passes
away and the mortgage creditor is satisfied, the residual value of his
house will then be subject to the state’s claims because a house
subject to a reverse mortgage remains in the senior’s estate until the
lender forecloses on the loan. In contrast, the medical estate
recovery program will not affect the estate of a senior who opts for
an annuity charge contract instead because the immovable is fully
transferred out of the senior’s estate at the time of contracting. The
annuity charge contract therefore better serves the interests of a
senior’s decedents by offering much more protection to the value of
their inheritance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 2012 revision to Title X, Book III, of the Louisiana Civil
Code brought about a number of important substantive changes to
Louisiana law—it effectuated the long-awaited repeal of the rent of
lands articles, it improved the prior articles pertaining to annuity
contracts, and it created the annuity charge as a real right that may
secure performance under an annuity contract. The revision
advances the ongoing modernization of the Civil Code that the
Law Institute began years ago and desirably responds to the
societal developments that have occurred in recent years. The
newly enacted annuity contract and annuity charge articles are
groundbreaking innovations that may serve as a template for
similar provisions in other civil law jurisdictions. In large part, the
dedicated members of the Louisiana Law Institute’s Rent of Lands
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
149. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:153.4(D) (2010). However, the department
shall not take any action to recover in the case of undue hardship.
150. LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RULE, MEDICAID ESTATE
RECOVERY (1996), available at http://www.doa.la.gov/osr/reg/may96/9605
_049.pdf. If certain criteria are met, the State may even execute a lien on the
beneficiary’s immovable property before death. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)–(b). Three
criteria must be met before a State can execute such a lien: (1) The beneficiary
must be an inpatient in a nursing facility; (2) he or she must not be reasonably
expected to be discharged from the medical institution and return home; and (3)
there must be no spouse, child under 21, or sibling of the beneficiary residing in
the house. Id.
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and Annuities Committee provided the finished product. They
spent well over two years identifying problems in prior law,
drafting legislation, critically examining the new articles, and
reworking them over and over again. These distinguished lawyers,
judges, and professors dedicated countless, uncompensated hours
to improving the law of Louisiana and deserve recognition for their
work. Although some parts of this Article may appear critical of
the revised articles, these criticisms are primarily levied at the
ambiguities that form an inherent part of any legislation. All things
considered, the 2012 revision to Title X is truly a legislative tour
de force.

